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Comments
The Civil Disturbance Regulations: Threats
Old and New
DoMINIc J. CAMPISI*
In a recent article in this journal,'  Professor David E.
Engdahl joined in the criticism' of the Nixon Administration's civil
disturbance regulations.' He noted the impropriety of the claim of an
inherent presidential power to use military force to execute the law or
to protect federal property and functions as asserted in these regula-
tions.4 He pointed out the flaws in the assertion that naval and Marine
Corps personnel could be used by the President without checks pro-
vided by Congress,5 and examined some of the other devices used to
circumvent the strictures of the Posse Comitatus Act.' However, his
analysis was flawed by a quixotic interpretation of the relevant con-
stitutional and legislative history, and of the regulations themselves.
This comment will attempt to demonstrate the flavis in Engdahl's ap-
proach.
Professor Engdahl correctly asserts that our traditions preclude
the use of distinctively military force to execute the laws except when
all civil measures have failed. However, he incorrectly interprets the
current regulations as authorizing such a use of unbridled military power
and martial law. The current regulations call for the use of military
forces in subordination to civil authorities, protect the rights of citizens
to trial at law, strictly limit the use of deadly force, and subject
military personnel to the sanctions and deterrence of federal and state
civil laws governing the use of deadly force. In adcaition, some of the
* B.A. 1966, University of Santa Clara; M.P.A. 1968, XX oodrow Wilson School,
Princeton University; J.D. 1974, Yale University; Law Clerk to Judge Eugene A.
Wright, 9th Circuit Court of Appeals, and Member of the California Bar.
I Engdahl, The New Civil Disturbance Regulations: The Threat of Military Inter-
vention, 49 IND. L.J. 581 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Intervention].
2 E.g., Note, Honored in the Breech: Presidential Authori.'y to Execute the Laws
with Military Force, 83 YALE L.. 130 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Honored].
3 32 C.F.R § 215 (1974) ; see also id. § 501.
'Intervention at 607-12; see Honored at 132-37.
5 Intervention at 603-05; see Honored at 144.
a18 U.S.C. § 1385 (1970). See Intervention at 605-12; but see Honored at 139-40;
144-46.
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fears expressed in the article about the potential under the regulations
for an expansive use of troops at the discretion of military comman-
ders are not warranted by an examination of all the regulations and
an examination of the history of practice under them. These defects
should not be permitted to obscure the very real problems posed by the
civil disturbance regulations which do merit a prompt congressional
response.'
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY FRAmEWORK
The power of the federal government to use military force to
execute the laws and protect the states from domestic violence has never
been clearly articulated in the Constitution or statutes. The problems
of obtaining judicial review" have left us with little judicial guidance
as well.
The constitutional scheme was a compromise based on conflicting
fears of dominance of the states by the federal government,' of the
impotence of state and federal governments in the face of popular
resistance to the enforcement of law, 0 and of presidential or military
dictatorship.1 The scheme reflected the inconclusive debate between
the partisans of militia and those of a regular army. 2 In the face of
such conflicts the language of the Constitution and early military legis-
lation was necessarily quite vague.
As a check on the executive, Congress was given the power to
organize, arm, and discipline the militia," to provide for calling forth
the militia to execute the laws of the United States, to raise and
support the regular military force,'5 and to make rules for the govern-
ment and regulation of the land and naval forces.'" Although it was
clear that the framers of the Constitution had intended that regular
troops could be used to execute the laws,'7 no provision was made for
7 See Honored at 147-50.
8 Id. at 150-52.
9 See, e.g., remarks of Col. George Mason, in 1 M. FAXRAND, THE REcoRns OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 339 (1934), and those of Patrick Henry, in 3 J. ELLIOT,
DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE F ER. CoN-
STITUTOiN 422-24 (2d ed. 1881) [hereinafter cited as ELloT].
'o Cf. e.g., Letter from Elbridge Gerry to James Monroe, June 11, 1787, in 3 M.
FARRAND, supra note 9, at 45.
11 See, e.g., debate at 2 M. FAiRAND, supra note 9, at 329-33, 385-88.
12 See, e.g., statement of George Washington to the President of the Continental Con-
gress, Sept. 24, 1776, in W. MiLLIs, AMERICAN MILITARY THOUGHT 13 (1966).
13 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 ci. 16.
14 Id. cl. 15.
15 Id. cls. 12 & 13.
I' Id. ci. 14.
17 See, e.g., statement of Wilson Nicholas, 3 ELLIOT, mipra note 9, at 389-90; THE
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this in the Constitution or in the initial military legislation.1
Current statutes empower the President to use regular or militia
forces to respond to requests for assistance from state governments, 9
to enforce the laws of the United States,20 to protect the rights of per-
sons within the states when both state and federal laws are violated,"
to reinforce the Secret Service in protecting the President and Vice
President and major candidates for those offices, 2 and to meet specified
contingencies.23 The President is prohibited from using troops to inter-
fere with elections,2 and from using them as a posse comitatus or other-
wise to execute the laws other than as expressly provided by the Con-
stitution or act of Congress.2" This latter restriction thus prohibits
the use of troops without the issuance of a proclamation28 or the military
enforcement of state law without either a state request for assistance
or a concurrent violation of federal law.27
THE ENGDAHL CRITIQUE
In a series of articles, 28  Professor Engdahl has developed a
FEDE.ALST No. 28 (A. Hamilton).
18 Act of May 2, 1792, ch. 28, §§ 1 & 2, 1 Stat. 264. Explicit permission was granted
by the Act of Mar. 3, 1807, ch. 39, 2 Stat. 443. In the interim, the first three Presidents
all used regular troops to execute the law based on their inherent duty to see that the
laws be faithfully executed. See U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 3; Honored, supra note 2, at 134
n.36.
1) 10 U.S.C. § 331 (1970), discussed in Intervention, supra note 1, at 583-90.
20 10 U.S.C. § 332 (1970), discussed in Intervention at 590-93.
21 10 U.S.C. § 333 (1970), discussed in Intervention at 593-97. Engdail believes
that section 333 permits the use of federal troops to execute state laws. University of
Colo. Law Revision Center, Military Troops in Civil Disorders, 43 CoLo. L. REV. 399, 409
(1972) [hereinafter cited as Troops]. This conclusion is contradcted by the plain mean-
ing of the statute itself and a study of the congressional debates surrounding its passage.
See CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 567, 703 (1871) (remarks of Sen. Edmunds). The
Nixon Administration made the same error. See 32 C.F.R. § 215.4(c) (2) (i) (c) (1974) ;
Honored at 139-40. Section 333 was held constitutional. Cf. Griffen v. Breckenridge,
403 U.S. 88, 99 (1971) (dissenting opinion); 22 H.R.J. Res. 1292, 82 Stat. 170 (1968).
Professor Engdahl believes this violates the Posse Comitatus Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1385
(1974), because the resolution does not expressly mention the use of troops. Congress
clearly intended the resolution to permit the use of military personnel, see 114 CONG. REC.
16,170 (1968) (remarks of Sen. Javits). Cf. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 236-38
(1972). However, the expansive use of this provision by President Nixon to authorize
the commitment of thousands of troops on five occasions provides a strong policy argu-
ment for a restrictive reading of this provision. See Honored 2t 145-46. It should be
noted that the reservations expressed by Professor Engdahl about the use of troops pur-
suant to H.R.J. Res. 1292 parallel the arguments made against the use of troops in a
posse.23 See Honored at 138 n.60.
2418 U.S.C. § 592 (1970).
25 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (1970).
26 10 U.S.C. § 334 (1970).
2 7 Honored at 139-41.
2 8 See, in addition to those mentioned in notes 1 & 21 supra, Engdahl, Soldiers, Riots,
1975]
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theory that our constitutional tradition and due process of law require
that military force be applied only in a limited set of circumstances:
1) Distinctively military force can be used only in cases of in-
surrection after ordinary civil measures have failed. 9
2) The troops used in other circumstances must be "obedient to
the ordinary local civilian officials (state or federal, depending upon
whether state or federal law enforcement is the objective)."" Use of
troops under presidential control in such circumstances is impermis-
sible.8
3) Deadly force can be used only "under a standard of reason-
ableness under the circumstances." 82
4) The conduct of troops must be governed by civil standards to
be reviewed by courts.8"
While there can be no serious disagreement about the latter two
assertions, the first two pose some serious problems.
Professor Engdahl holds that the use of the military domestically
should be governed by the rule of Lord Mansfield that troops could
be utilized-as civilians-to enforce the law in circumstances other
than insurrections. In Lord Mansfield's words: "[n]o matter whether
their coats be red or brown, they have been called in aid of the laws,
not to subvert them, or overturn the constitution, but to preserve
both."8' Engdahl asserts, without support, that the present military
regulations call for the use of a "distinctively military force" in cases
other than insurrections and that such usage is violative of the common
law and the due process clause of the fifth amendment. This argument;
misinterprets Mansfield, grafts an unwarranted requirement of local
control onto our constitutional history, and ignores the fact that the
current regulations call for the use of troops in strict subordination to
civil authorities, under civil standards and sanctions governing the
use of deadly force, and without supplanting the civil court system."
His claim that troops cannot be used to suppress riots or execute the
and Revolution: The Law and History of Military Troops in Civil Disorders, 57 IowA L.
Rav. 1 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Soldiers].
29 Troops, supra note 21, at 419.
8o Id. at 418.
8LId.
32 Id.
3SIntervention, supra note 1, at 617 n.15; Troops at 417.
8421 THE PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY OF ENGLAND 698 (W. Cobbett ed. 1814); see
also Soldiers at 32-34.
85 The applicable federal regulations and military regulations have a very low visi-




laws in situations short of insurrection is not supported by constitu-
tional precedent, historic practice, or the realities of government.
The British Precedents
Limitations on the use of military force in Britain derived from
fears that troops would be used by the Crown or a Cromwell to usurp
the power of Parliament" or to deny citizens the right to a civil trial
by their peers.37 There were also fears that excessive force would be
used."8
Although the historic method utilized in Britain to suppress civil
disturbances had been the power of magistrates to call on citizens of
the county and members of the milita for ass, stance-the posse
comitatus-by the middle of the 18th century this practice had become
ineffective." Until the development of civilian police forces in the 19th
century, reliance was placed on regular military forces for restoring
order. "It is, indeed, no exaggeration to say that early industrial
Britain was policed by soldiers; they put down virtaally every serious
disturbance."'"
Faced with claims that such uses of military force conflicted with
Britain's historic fear of military intervention, the judiciary developed
an accommodating doctrine which recognized that such practices were
a necessary evil. Troops could be subjected to civilian rules governing
use of force, civil trial could be guaranteed to insurgents, and the risk
that the executive would be emboldened or the troops politicized was
ignored in the paramount need to restrain the disorders that threatened
the fabric of industrializing England.
The basic precedent was set during the suppression of a sectarian
riot which devastated London in 1780-the Lord Gordon Riots. During
this disorder the local magistrates proved unwilling to risk the fury of
the mob or the possibility of civil punishment for undue use of force.
They also were quite realistic in recognizing that the militia and the
citizenry were with the mob and would reject a call to the posse.,'
George III responded to the disorder by issuing a general order to the
regular troops which he had moved into the city:
In obedience to an order of the King in Council, the military to
act without waiting for direction from the Cixil Magistrates,
38 Soldiers at 13-14.
87 See id. at 6.
38 Intervention at 585 n.20.
39 T. CRITCHLEY, THE CONQUEST OF VIOLENCE 74 (1970).
40Id. at 68.
4 Id. at 84.
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and to use force for dispersing the illegal and tumultuous as-
semblies of the people.42
Some 285 persons were killed in the actions which followed.'
Lord Mansfield defended this action in Parliament, arguing that "[t] he
military have been called in, and very wisely called in, not as soldiers,
but as citizens . . . ."' Thus the underlying precedent of Engdahl's
critique involved a use of troops by the chief executive, without the
control of local officials. The use of troops in the Bristol riot of 1831,
in the aftermath of which Justice Tindal echoed the Mansfield doc-
trine,"5 was also accomplished without the intervention of the magis-
trates." Such uses of troops in the suppression of riots-which were
not insurrections-were held not only to be proper, but commendable,
and distinctly civil as well."
It should be noted that troops could not be moved from garrisons
by the magistrates without the permission of the military authorities
or the King. 8 If the case were otherwise, the King could be disarmed
and the defense of the county imperiled by the actions of local officials.
Unlike the militia, the regular troops were a national rather than a
local military body. Hence national authorities had to give permission
for their use.
British policy at the time of the framing of our Constitution
included the concept that troops could be used, under military or royal
command, as civilians to restore order. This doctrine was a face-
saving reaction to the inabilty of the posse and traditional control
measures to meet the challenge of economic and class disorders. Thus
martial law-confinement of civilians by the military and trial by courts-
martial and the conduct of civil affairs by military edict-could exist
only where the civil authorities had been ousted. The use of force had
to be reasonable under the circumstances-although the bloody statis-
tics of the industrial riots confirm that rioters who failed to disperse
were fair game. Regular troops who acted to support civil authorities
would be tried as civilians under civil standards of conduct.
American Constitutional Doctrine
As noted above, the compromises which produced our Constitution
42 Quoted in id. at 85.
48 G. Rurt, HANOvEIAN LONDON: 1714-1808, at 142 (1971).
421 THE PAMLIAmENTARY HIsToRY or ENGLAND 698 (W. Cobbett ed. 1814);
see Soldiers at 34.
45T. CRiTCHLEY, supra note 39, at 87.
4SId. at 124.
47 Soldiers at 33-34.
48 T. CaRTcHLEY, spra note 39, at 74.
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provided no clear exposition of policy with respect to the use of military
force in domestic affairs. In general, the development of military
policy reflected the experience of the various states in dealing with past
disorders. For example, all of the states had provisions which gave the
governor the power to call up the militia to suppress insurrections.'9
Such provisions also held the military in strict subordination to civil
authorities.
The federal government was given authority to execute the laws,
suppress insurrections, and protect the states against domestic violence.
Professor Engdahl asserts that the Constitution and enabling
legislation reflected the doctrine that military force could not be used
by the President except in circumstances where the disorder was an
organized opposition to the existing governmental structure-an in-
surrection. ° This argument is not supported by the records of the con-
stitutional debates or the consistent practice of the past 200 years. The
fact is that the Constitution and the enabling legislation envisioned the
use of military force as a means of suppressing any sizable opposition
to the law which prevented the proper functioning of the government
or the enforcement of a law. Note that the military force used did not
rise to the level of martial law, but rather involved the use of military
force under military or presidential orders to support civil law enforce-
ment institutions.
The use of federal military force to supplant civilian courts and
legislative enactments has existed only during the Civil War and in the
early stages of the Second World War in the western part of the United
States. In the Milligan"' and Constantin52 cases the Supreme Court held
that civil trials could not be denied and civil laws could not be replaced
by military edict except where those institutions had been effectively elim-
inated by an insurrection or major disorder." However, the con-
stitutional debates illustrate that it was intended that troops could be
used in support of civil institutions in circumstances where civil law
enforcement was frustrated by disorders which did not rise to the level
49 Soldiers at 30.
50 Intervention at 586-87.
51 Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
52 Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378 (1932).
53 A major flaw in Engdahl's analysis lies in his confusing such martial law with
the use of troops under 10 U.S.C. §§ 331-33 (1970). The use of troops from the Whisky
Rebellion on-with the exception of the Civil War and in the early stages of the Second
World War in the western part of the United States-has been made to support and not
supplant civil institutions. The question of whether courts are closed by the disorder is
irrelevant unless the troops are used to apprehend people who will be incarcerated with-
out recourse to habeas corpus and tried by courts-martial.
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of insurrections. For example, during the debates at the Virginia ratify-
ing convention the question was raised why it was necessary to give
Congress power to provide for military forces to execute the laws as
well as suppress insurrections.
Mr. CLAY wished to know the instances where an opposi-
tion to the laws did not come within the idea of an insurrection.
Mr. MADISON replied, that a riot did not come within
the legal definition of an insurrection. There might be ziots,
to oppose the execution of the laws, which the civil power might
not be sufficient to quell."4
At another point in the debate, Madison argued that the Constitution
gave the federal government the power to use troops to assist law en-
forcement personnel who had been outnumbered by lawbreakers. He
alluded to recent experience in Alexandria and noted that "[t]he militia
ought to be called forth to suppress smugglers."55
Hence, when the federal government was given the power to
execute the laws, it was intended that disorders which did not amount
to insurrections could be suppressed. Indeed, the mention of the power
to use troops "to execute the Laws" would be surplusage if only in-
surrections could be met with military force.
Similarly, the concept of domestic violence contained in article
IV, section 4 of the Constitution is much broader than that of insur-
rection. During the Virginia debates, it was noted that "[a] republican
form of government is guarantied, and protection is secured against
invasion and domestic violence on application." 6  Madison explained
that the states could use their own militia "to suppress insurrections,
quell riots, &c., and call on the general government for the militia of
any other state, to aid them, if necessary."5
Engdahl argues that since the enabling legislation speaks only of
the use of troops to assist states confronted with "insurrection," '
federal assistance cannot be provided in circumstances of mere riots.
543 ELLIOT, supra note 9, at 410.
55 Id. at 414.
56 Id. at 427 (statement of George Nicholas).
57 Id. at 416. Note that the legislation only permits the federalization of the militia
of other than the requesting state. 10 U.S.C. § 331 (1970). This wording is a result of
fears expressed at the ratifying conventions that the federal government would federalize
and march away the militia of a requesting state. See 3 ELLIOT at 422 (Remarks of
Patrick Henry). Recent administrations have circumvented this provision by federaliz-
ing the requesting state's National Guard under 10 U.S.C. §§ 332 & 334 (1970). See, e.g.,
Proclamation No. 3795, 3 C.F.R. § 68 (1967). Engdahl misinterprets the purpose behind
this wording. Intervention at 584 n.19.
58 Intervention at 584-87.
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This is wholly unrealistic. First, the words "shall protect" indicate that
the requirement that the federal government protect the states "against
domestic Violence" is a mandatory one. The enabling legislation should
be read broadly to honor this policy. Thus the term "insurrection" in
the legislation has been interpreted to encompass "lawlessness and dis-
order beyond the control of the civil authorities." 9
In practice, the federal government has consistently responded to
requests from states to assist in suppressing riots which did not amount
to insurrections in the technical sense. The first instance in which such
aid was provided involved a labor dispute on a canal project in Mary-
land in 1834.0 The most recent example is the assistance provided
during the racial riots of 1968, and certainly those disorders did not
rise to an organized attempt to overthrow the government. It is in-
conceivable that any court would follow Engdahl's theory and hold that
the federal government could not provide assistance to a requesting
state facing an urban riot of the type found in Detroit in 1967. At
most Professor Engdahl's theory could validly be supported in arguing
that martial law could not be imposed in situations less than insurrec-
tions. So defined, the theory has little application to the current reg-
ulations or to an analysis of historic uses of military force to execute
the laws or suppress riots."'
USE OF TROOPS BY LOCAL AUTHORITIES
Professor Engdahl also maintains that due process and our Anglo-
American constitutional principles require that military forces may not
be employed merely under the control of the President as Commander-
in-Chief, but must act only under the tactical and strategic command
"of the civilian officials who would have charge of the situation if the
military personnel had not been employed." 2 There is no support for
this theory in our Constitution or the consistent history of military
practice in the United States.
As noted above, Engdahl's basic English precedents involved in-
terventions at the direction of the King and under the control of
military commanders. The same practice has been followed in the
United States. In recent years, however, civilian control has been
tightened by placing control of the military forces in the hands of a
69 United States v. Fischer, 280 F. 208, 210 (D. Neb. 1922).
60 See Morris, Andrew Jackson, Strikebreaker, 55 Am. HIsT. REV. 54 (1949).
61The current regulations do not contemplate the imposition of martial law or the
"distinctively military force" discussed by Engdahl. See text at notes 101-19 infra.
62 Intervention at 617 n.151.
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Senior Civilian Representative of the Attorney General (SCRAG) or
a senior representative of the President. While there are policy argu-
ments for placing such control in the hands of local officials, no con-
stitutional provision mandates this, and prudent military practice dictates
against it."5 In addition the broad claim that early American policy
required that troops could be used only by the President after local au-
thorities using federal troops had failed to suppress the violence is
equally without support in federal law or practice.
In order to deal with these arguments, it is best to examine
separately the policies and practice involved in the use of the troops
to execute federal law and those relating to interventions at the request
of state governments.
ENFORCEMENT OF FEDERAL LAWS
Professor Engdahl argues that when troops are used to execute
federal laws, they should act under the command of a federal marshal.
He argues that this is constitutionally mandated and follows the pattern
of early federal practice. It. can be argued that the marshals utilized
regular troops in their posses under the authorization of the 1792
military legislation which gave the marshals the same power as sheriffs
in enforcing the laws, i.e., the power to summon the posse comitatus."
The initial military legislation further provided:
That whenever the laws of the United States shall be opposed,
or the execution thereof obstructed, by combinations too powerful
to be suppressed by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings,
or by the powers vested in the marshals by this act . . . it shall
be lawful for the President . . . to call forth the militia of such
state to suppress such combinations, and to cause the laws to
be fully executed. 5
Engdahl concludes that this legislation could only mean that the
President could not use troops to execute the law until the marshal had
used militiamen and troops in his posse and failed to contain the dis-
order. In support of this interpretation, he cites an 1878 opinion of At-
torney General Charles Devens, stating:
68 Id.
6, Act of May 2, 1792, ch. 28, § 9, 1 Stat 265.
65 Id. § 2. Three years later Congress dropped the requirement that the President
:act only after being informed by a judge of the obstruction. Act of Feb. 28, 1795, ch. 36,
§ 2, 1 Stat. 424. Congress thus indicated that it intended troops to be used when the
-courts had not been disabled. The change in the wording of the Act in 1861, Act of




It has been the practice of the Government since its organ-
ization (so far as known to me) to permit the military forces of
the United States to be used in subordination to the marshall. .... 6
This interpretation of the historic practice is inaccurate. The
initial legislation contemplated no such grant of power; at most, sec-
tion 9 of the 1792 legislation authorized the marshal to call on state
militiamen. Authority to call on regular troops or federalized militia-
men would be inconsistent with the tenor of the law and the debates
leading to its enactment. The President himself was not given authority
by this legislation to use regular troops to execute the law.67 After
placing this and other restrictions on the power of the President to use
military force, it would have been counterproductive for Congress to
sanction the President, without controls, to permit his marshals to use
regular troops to execute the laws."
An examination of the early uses of the military bears out the
conclusion that the marshals, as well, did not have this power. In 1792,
following the passage of the military legislation, President Washing-
ton found it necessary to issue a proclamation exhorting obedience to
the revenue laws and urging support for the federal courts and officials.
His proposed draft of the proclamation included a charge to military
officers to assist in the enforcement of the laws. This mention of the
military was dropped in response to the criticism of Edmund Randolph:
The charge to the military would inflame the Country. Nor
do I think it sufficient to let it stand upon the word "Officers"
generally as the military have no power on the subject and where
this is the case of the exciting of a suspicion to introduce them
cannot be too sedulously avoided. 9
If the 1792 legislation had in fact empowered the marshal to call on
regular troops, Randolph could not have stated that "the military have
no power on the subject." If Engdahl's interpretation is correct, it
would have been entirely proper to exhort the military and to urge them
to rally to the support of the court. It should be noted also that in the
three years of turmoil in Pennsylvania that followed, there is no evi-
66 16 Op. Arr'Y GEN. 163 (1878), quoted in Intervention at 601 n.83.
67 See note 18 supra.
68 Since sheriffs did not have authority to command federal troops to join their
posse-they were not citizens of the county as were the regular militia, 7 CONG. REc. 4302
(1878) (remarks of Sen. Mfaxey)-the grant to the marshals by section 9 of the 1792
legislation would convey no greater power; see also Opinion of Judge Advocate General
W.M. Dunn, June 8, 1878, in F. WILsoN, FEDERAL Am IN DOME TrC DISTURBANCES 290,
S. Doc. No. 263, 67th Cong., 2d Sess. (1922).6 9 Letter to Alexander Hamilton, Sept. 8, 1792, in 12 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER
HA IrToN 336, 340 (H. Syrett ed. 1967) (italics in original).
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dence that the marshal of Western Pennsylvania ever called on the
federal troops garrisoned in the area despite his difficulties in enforc-
ing the law.
Even after the passage of the 1807 legislation permitting the Presi-
dent to use regular troops to enforce federal laws,"' the evidence of
presidential action indicates that the marshals did not have the claimed
power. For example, when President Jefferson found that federal
customs officials were unable to enforce the embargo laws, he obtained
a specific authorization from Congress to use regular troops under the
command of subordinate civil officials to enforce the law.7 If the
marshals already had this power, Jefferson would not have had to issue
such a proclamation to use troops to suppress minor incidents of op-
position to the laws"' or to ask Congress for permission to delegate
control of federal troops to lesser officials. Similarly, when President
Jackson was faced with the Nullification controversy, he also was
compelled to obtain specific authorization from Congress to use regular
forces under the command of the marshal."3
The use of federal troops in the posses of marshals actually began
in 1854 as a means of enforcing the Fugitive Slave Act.71 That law
had stated that it was the duty of federal marshals to arrest and return
all fugitives brought to their attention, and reasserted the marshal's
power to summon the posse.75
When a Boston mob released a fugitive slave in the custody of a
federal marshal in 1851, President Fillmore found it necessary to issue
a proclamation in order to direct the local federal military commander
to assist the marshal.76 The proclamation only served to heighten
hostility towards the marshals (and the President), whereupon Fillmore
turned to Congress for relief, asking for the elimination of the procla-
mation requirement and for the power to delegate control over such
military actions "to any civil officer of the United States.177 Congress
took no action in response to this request. Again, if the marshal already
had the power to call the Boston garrison to join his posse, this whole
episode is meaningless.
70 See note 18 supra.
7'Act of Jan. 7, 1809, ch. 5, § 11, 2 Stat. 510.72 See 1 J. RICHARDSON, A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRES-
I)ENTS: 1789-1897, at 450 (1897).
78 See Act of Mar. 2, 1833, ch. 57, § 5, 4 Stat 634. See also 2 J. RIcHn.DsON, supra
note 72, at 630.7 4 Act of Sept. 18, 1850, ch. 60, 9 Stat. 462.
71 Id. § 5, 9 Stat. 463.
76 5 J. RIcHARDsoN, supra note 72, at 110.
7 Id. at 101; see also Honored, supra note 2, at 142.
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When President Pierce faced the same dilemia in 1854, his At-
torney General, Caleb Cushing, found a means of circumventing the
problem by ruling that federal troops could be used as part of the posse
comitatus" This obviated the need for the President to issue a pro-
clamation in such circumstances and thus avoided the political risks of
publicly supporting the enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Act.""
The use of federal troops in the command of federal civil officials
continued after this date, with troops used extensively under the com-
mand of federal marshals," federal officers,8 ' and sheriffs.82 Congress
ended this practice in 1878 with the passage of the Posse Comitatus
Act.83 Although the Act was a product of the struggle to end federal
intervention in the South," the debates indicated a finding by Congress
that the use of regular troops in posses resulted in serious abuses."5
The debates also evidenced an awareness on the part of many Con-
gressmen and Senators that the use of regular troops in a posse dated
from the 1854 opinion of Attorney General Cushing.86
It should be noted that, even at the height of the posse practice,
marshals did not have unrestricted authority to call for the services of
federal troops-as Engdahl's theory requires. Before a marshal could.
utilize troops, permission had to be sought from the President,87 and
military commanders had authority to refuse the command of a
marshal.8 8 This reduces the effect of the posse to a deployment of
troops at the command of the President, reflecting the parallel British
practice of requiring royal permission before regulars could be moved
from their garrisons to serve in a magistrate's posse.89 The prohibition
on the use of troops to execute the law as part of a marshal's posse
contained in the Posse Comitatus Act was thus a reaffirmance of his-
toric practice, rather than a rejection of it, as asserted by Professor
78 6 OP. ATr"Y GEN. 466 (1854).
79 The potential of the posse practice as a means of avoiding public responsibility for
the overt or covert use of troops is one of the more objectionable features of the current
military regulations. See Honored at 140-41.80 See Honored at 142 n.85.
81 Id. at 142 n.86.
82 Id. at 142 n.87.
83 Act of June 18, 1878, ch. 263, § 15, 20 Stat. 145, 152, now codified at 18 U.S.C.
§ 1385 (1970).
84 See Honored at 142-43.
85 Id.
86 7 CONG. REc. 4296 (Remarks of Sen. Teller), 4241 (Remarks of Sen. Sargent),
3582 (Remarks of Congressman Kimmel); see note 78 supra.
87 J. SE rON, THE UNITED STATES ARMY A D RECONSTRu CrioN, 1865-1877, at 219
(1967).
88 Id. at 217.




Since 1792, the President has had the direction to utilize military
force to execute the laws when he determined that the law could not
otherwise be enforced."' There was no requirement that he first resort
to the use of regular troops in a marshal's posse. When troops were in
fact committed to execute federal laws, they acted under the control
of representatives of the President or military commanders rather than
under the direction of a marshal.
Protection of the States Against Domestic Violence
Professor Engdahl asserts that when troops are utilized in re-
sponse to a request for assistance from state legislatures or governors
pursuant to the guarantee clause, they should be subordinated to
"state magistrates and police."' 2 Again, this requirement is without
constitutional support or historical precedent.
When troops have been committed in response to state re-
quests for aid, they generally acted under the command of federal civil
and military officers. For example, in the first use of federal troops
in such a role, in suppression of labor violence in Maryland in 1834,
troops acted under the orders of federal military commanders. 3 Al-
though there were some instances where federal troops acted under
state command,9 in such circumstances the governor was the command-
ing official. 5 The constitutional debates reflect this policy of retention
of command by federal officials, and the debates at the Virginia ratify-
ing convention demonstrate that the delegates were not only aware that
federal officers would command troops, but voiced fears that the federals
would take command of the requesting state's militia as well." As a
consequence of this fear, the enabling legislation was written to permit
the federalization only of the militia of states other than the requesting
one.9 Such a provision would be unnecessary if the federalized militia
were to be under state control, either of the governor or local officials."
90 Troops at 411.
91 See note 65 supra.
92 Troops, supra note 21, at 418 n.94; see also Intervention, supra note 1, at 617 n.151.
93 See note 60 supra.
94 F. WILSON, supra note 68, at 231 (use of troops during Dorr's Rebellion) ; at 272-
76 (use of troops in Maryland and West Virginia during strike of 1877) ; C. DoWELL,
MILrrARY AID TO THE Cn'IL PowER 200 (1925) (use of troops during the West Virginia
coal strike of 1921). The military objected to and obtained a change in this policy.
F. WILSON, supra, at 278.
95 F. WILsoN, supra note 68, at 231.
96 3 ELLIOT, supra note 9, at 422 (Remarks of Patrick Henry).
97 See statement of George Nicholas in id. at 425-27.




As noted above, British practice endorsed the use of regular troops
under the authority of military commanders acting under royal com-
mand. Control by magistrates was not essential to a judicial finding that
the action of the troops was essentially civilian and in conformity to
the common law.
In the United States there was no constitutional requirement that
troops enforcing federal laws act under the command of federal
marshals. The practice of using troops in a posse did not itself begin
until 1854, and was emphatically rejected by Congress in 1878. Such
use of troops was thus never a prerequisite to use of troops by the
President. With respect to the use of troops to assist state governments,
the constitutional debates indicated that federal command was to be
retained. Federal enabling legislation has consistently reflected this
intent.
Although current policy calls for command of troops by civilian
representatives of the President rather than local magistrates, there
may be some policy considerations which would dictate local control:
familiarity of local officials with the dispute and locale, placement of
control in the hands of officials who would prosecute as well as ap-
prehend offenders, and support of local governmental institutions at a
time when their authority and legitimacy has been undercut by violence.
Such considerations have been outweighed in practice by the need for
continuity in command of military forces, for personnel experienced
in the command of large task forces and the suppression of disorders
with minimum use of force, for protection against local prejudices and
excesses,"9 and to prevent the abdication of the President's responsibili-
ties as Commander-in-Chief and the misuse of federal military power
in the hands of local officials.
Command of federal riot control troops by local officials or federal
marshals is impracticable. Professor Engdahl is imbued with the view
of a 19th century marshal leading a half dozen troopers to collect a debt
or arrest a fugitive-a span of control which would permit him to
dictate every move they made. However, the reality of riot control
tactics-in the 19th as well as the 20th centuries-is that no civil official
could do more than set policies governing the conduct of the thousands
he retained control-since the federal government would ther bear the cost of their
salaries and supplies.
09 See, e.g., dismissal of Colorado National Guard by President Wilson after Lud-
low Massacre, F. WILSON, supra note 68, at 313; discharge of vcluntary militia in Kansas
in 1856 after confrontation with abolitionist forces, id. at 241.
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of troops who are needed to restore order quickly without recourse to
firepower.' Reliance must be placed on military officers and NCO's
to carry out the dictated policies on use of force and the conduct of the
riot control mission. Moreover, local law enforcement officials-
whether local police or federal marshals-lack the training and experi-
ence with federal military organization and tactics to command the large
bodies of troops used to contain the recent urban disorders:- for ex-
ample, the 25,000 troops which were committed in Detroit in 1967.
The premise of a local control requirement is that local officials
will be more temperate in the use of deadly force than federal civil or
military officers. The reverse is probably true. For example, the bulk
of shooting and fatalities in the Detroit riot took place prior to federal
intervention. The indiscriminate use of deadly force in the Newark riot
by state and city police and the intemperate use of force by local police
during the 1968 Democratic National Convention in Chicago point
out the need for the intervention of unbiased and neutral federal au-
thorities. There seems no reason for believing that a local federal mar-
shal will be more restrained than an assistant attorney general. More-
over, there is no policy basis for preferring an appointive local federal
officer over a senior one.
Distinctively Military Force
Professor Engdahl has also argued that distinctively military
force cannot be used until civil options have been exhausted and the
courts closed.'' He asserts that the present federal military regula-
tions are constitutionally infirm because they contemplate the use of
a "distinctively military force" in circumstances where the courts are
open. By this term Engdahl implies something akin to martial law. A
"distinctively military force" involves-in his view-the use of troops
under military command or the command of a national rather than a
local official; review of the actions of the military personnel under
military standards rather than the common law standard of reasonable-
ness under the circumstances ;102 and displacement of civil institutions
by military ones-the use of courts-martial for civilian law violators
and the replacement of civil laws with military edict.'03
An Engdahl correctly points out, federal military forces used
domestically may use only that degree of force which is reasonably
100 See Honored, mipra note 2, at 142 n.86.
101 Troops at 418; Soldiers, supra note 28, at 70 n.324.
102 Troops at 417-18.
1o Intervention at 586-87.
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necessary."' However, with the exception of the Civil War,' federal
troops have been subject to civil standards and sanctions for acts done
during the course of riot duty. For example, the troops involved in
two killings during the Whisky Rebellion were tried in accordance with
civilian law." The same is true of present military practice under the
new civil disturbance regulations.
Engdahl's assertion that troops cannot be used to displace civil
institutions except when they are incapacitated by disorder is essen-
tially correct. The Milligan and Constantin decisions point to the fact
that courts-martial and military edict cannot be used in circumstances
where civil institutions are functioning. But the basic flaw in Engdahl's
analysis is his argument that current military policy envisions the use
of "distinctively military force." Under the strictures of the Mansfield
doctrine and American constitutional principles, the use of troops under
the Defense Department regulations is essentially civilian in nature.
Line of Command
Engdahl asserts that federal troops used to execute the law act
under purely military command.'" This is not true. The Interdepart-
mental Action Plan between the Department of Justice and the Depart-
ment of Defense approved by the President in 1969 places the At-
torney General in control of all federal forces in riot control and law
enforcement situations.' The Attorney General prepares federal policy
governing the use of troops in such circumstances, and an assistant
attorney general is sent to the scene of the disorder to observe the situa-
tion and report to the Attorney General on the implementation of
policies established and to recommend changes to aeet the current dis-
order."0 9
During Emergencies, Civil Disturbance Teams under the
leadership of an Assistant Attorney General are sent to the scenes
of disturbances to consult with local officials, to report to the
Attorney General on the need for Federal assistance, and to direct
any Federal effort needed." °
104Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 45-46 (1849).
105 Intervention at 593.
'06 See L. BALDWIN, THE WHISKEY RiEmEs: THE STORY OF A FRONTIER UPRISING
226 (1939).
107 Intervention at 613.
108 Interdepartmental Action Plan at 2, 3.





While the military commander is in operational control of the
troops, he is under orders to consult with the Senior Civilian Represen-
tative of the Attorney General (SCRAG) on all significant matters."'
Given the SCRAG's direct communications with the Attorney General
and President and his constant supervision of the federal forces, the
control of the federal task force is firmly in civilian hands.
This policy of placing a civilian in command of the federal task
force was also observed by the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations.
Such men as Nicholas Katzenbach, John Doar, Bryon White and Cyrus
Vance were in charge of federal military task forces during the 1960's.
Such use of senior federal officials to control military task forces pro-
vides an appropriate degree of civilian control over the military and
provides a degree of expertise in the control of such operations which
could not be met by the placement of control in local officials.
Civil Sanctions
When federal troops are utilized in law enforcement missions,
they are subject to the same sanctions and standards of review which
would govern the actions of local police. The Army Field Manual,
Civil Disturbances, which establishes military policy in this area, states:
When Federal military forces are employed in the United States
and its territories, whether or not martial law prevails, the acts
of individual military personnel are subject to review by the civil
courts in actions for damages or in criminal proceedings.1 12
Troops are also advised that they will be held responsible by civil courts
for following orders of military commanders "if the illegality of the
act is so obvious as to be immediately apparent to a reasonable
person.""' Similarly, military lawyers have been counseled to be
familiar with state and local law in order to be able to prepare the
defense of any soldier accused of improper use of force during a civil
disturbance mission." 4
Support of Civil Institutions
When troops are utilized under the Defense Department regula-
tions they do not bring with them martial law and do not supplant civil
" 32 C.F.R. § 501.3(b) (1974); Department of the Army Civil Disturbance Plan,
Annex C, Appendix 7, at 4 (1975).
112DEP RTMENT OF THE ARMY, CML DISTURBANCES (Field Manual 19-15) II 2-10
(1972).
118 Id.




institutions. For example, civilian offenders arrested by military per-
sonnel are turned over to the civil authorities as soon as possible after
apprehension.11" There is no provision for courts-martial of offenders.
When curfews or other restrictions are necessary, local officials are
used to accomplish such procedures and violators are tried under local
laws.118 Under the Mansfield doctrine, such uses of troops can only be
described as civil, rather than as "distinctively military."
Use of Deadly Force
It should also be noted that federal planning calls for an extremely
restricted use of deadly force in civil disturbance control situations.
Federal military commanders are instructed that:
The primary rule which governs the actions of federal forces in
assisting state and local authorities to restore law and order is
that you must at all times use only the minimum force required
to accomplish your mission.1T
The standards regulating the use of deadly force are in strict compliance
with those regulating civil police forces." 8 The regulation even pre-
cludes the loading of weapons by soldiers unless ordered to do so by a
superior officer or when necessary to protect life or prevent the com-
mission of serious felonies." 9
It can thus be seen that the current regulations contemplate the use
of military personnel under civilian control and under civil, rather than
military, standards of conduct. The manner in which troops are utilized
to enforce the laws, suppress insurrections, and protect the states against
domestic violence is in strict compliance with our constitutional and
historical precedents.
Emergency Power
Professor Engdahl is also concerned with the threat posed to our
civil institutions by the regulations permitting the intervention of the
military to restore order in cases where
sudden and unexpected civil disturbances, disasters, or calamities
seriously endanger life and property and disrupt normal govern-
ment functions to such an extent that duly constituted local au-
thorities are unable to control the situation.120
" 32 C.F.R. § 501.1(c) (1974).
118 See, e.g., Glover v. District of Columbia, 255 A.2d 556 (D.C. App. 1969).
'17 Department of the Army Civil Disturbance Plan, Annex C, Appendix 7, at 10.
'is Id. at 12-13.
9 Id. at 15.
120 32 C.F.R. § 215.4(c) (1) (i) (1974).
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While Engdahl asserts that the prior "regulations contained nothing
at all comparable to this bold claim of inherent executive power... ,,21
this regulation and its predecessors have been a part of military practice
since the start of this century. A similar regulation provided the au-
thority for military assistance during the 1906 earthquake in San
Francisco." Prior regulations also contained a provision for the use
of military force to restore order during calamities when normal lines
of communication have been disrupted." 8 The current regulations,
as they have since 1953,'2 restrict such interventions to an "emergency
so imminent as to make it dangerous to await instructions from the De-
partment of the Army requested through the speediest means of com-
munications available."'" The regulations have tightly limited such
actions:
However, in view of the availability of rapid communications
capabilities, it is unlikely that action under this authority would
be justified without prior Department of the Army approval while
communications facilities are operating. Such action, without
proper authorization, of necessity may be prompt and vigorous,
but should be designed for the preservation of law and order and
the protection of life and property until such time as instructions
from higher authority have been received, rather than as an assump-
tion of functions normally performed by the civil authorities.126
Certainly one can worry that there might be a risk of improper in-
tervention of military forces into civilian affairs, but this is really a fear
of military adventurism which would not be restrained by any regula-
tions, even the tightly circumscribed one present here. In brief, the
emergency regulation permits military action to support civilian authori-
ties without recourse to a presidential decision only in circumstances of
a calamity that prevents communication with higher authority. This is
a necessary and commonsense regulation which has not resulted in
untoward military intervention during this century. There appears to be
no cause for alarm.
Pre-positioning of Troops
Professor Engdahl also expresses some fears about the provision
121Intervention at 610.
122 DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, MnTrrARY AsSISTANCE TO CIVIL AUTHORITIES (D.A.
Pamphlet 27-11) 20 (1966).
12832 C.F.R. § 187.5(a) (1) (1968); 32 C.F.R. § 501.2(a) (1969).
124 See 18 FED. REG. 5593 (1953).
12532 C.F.R. § 501.2(a) (1974).
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in the current regulations permitting the pre-positioning of bodies of
military personnel of less than battalion size without the approval of the
President. 127 There is some merit in his concern that the pre-positioning
of troops outside of federal enclaves might be used to chill the rights
of demonstrators. Troops have been used in this function since the
1877 railroad disorders,128 most recently in the 1971 demonstrations
in New Haven and the antiwar demonstrations in Washington, D.C.,
in 1970 and 1971.129 Professor Engdahl's fear that local commanders
will use this power to move troops onto the streets is without substance.
At most the regulation contemplates the movement of troops between
federal military installations-and even then with the approval of the
civilian leaders of the Defense Department.
It is understandable why Professor Engdahl is so suspicious when
one examines the other provisions of the Nixon Administration regula-
tions. These provisions provide for the use of federal military forces
to execute the laws by the President without the issuance of a procla-
mation,3 0 and permit the intervention of federal forces to execute state
laws when no federal laws have been violated and when no request has
been made by the state. 3' They would also permit the use of naval and
Marine Corps personnel to execute the law-covertly or otherwise-as
a posse comitatus."' As I have stated elsewhere, these claims to an in-
herent presidential power to execute the laws cannot be sustained."3
CONCLUSION
Professor Engdahl has correctly pointed out the inadequacy of
the civil disturbance regulations' claim to an inherent presidential power
to use military force to execute the laws. His analysis is flawed,
however, by his unsupported claim that federal military forces cannot
constitutionally be used to execute the laws in circumstances which
do not constitute insurrections, by his insistence that there is con-
stitutional support for his requirement that troops act under the
command of local authorities, and by his mistaken belief that the regu-
lations call for the use of troops in a "distinctively military" role.
'
27 Intervention, supra note 1, at 614; 32 C.F.tL § 215.5(g) (1974).
12
8 F. WimsoN, supra note 68, at 284.
129 The Supreme Court has held that such pre-positioning does not present an in-
jury for which a judicial remedy exists. Alabama v. United States, 373 U.S. 545 (1963).
130 Honored, supra note 2, at 148-49.
l Id. at 139-40.
3
2 Id. at 144; but see United States v. Walen, 490 F.2d 372, 375 (4th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 416 U.S. 983 (1974).
133 Honored at 132-37.
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